ABSTRACT Deploying electronic health records (EHRs) is now an undisputable trend in healthcare systems. Through affording benefits like flexibility and low cost, the cutting-cloud cloud storage is becoming a popular solution to store a massive amount of EHRs to depress the local storage. Nevertheless, storing sensitive information such as health records on the cloud incurs severe security and privacy risks. In this paper, we propose a novel cloud storage system for EHRs which fully ensures the data privacy by employing the Shamir's secret sharing. In this system, an EHR is divided into multiple segments by a healthcare center, and the segments are distributed to numerous cloud servers. When retrieving the EHR, the healthcare center captures segments from partial cloud servers and reconstructs the EHRs. Meanwhile, in reality, the reconstruction of a shared EHR could be much burdensome for a healthcare center or a patient, we thus propose a practical cloud storage scheme which outsources the reconstruction of a shared EHR to a cloud computing service provider. Such a solution can drastically boost the efficiency of the proposed scheme. As far as we know, our scheme is the first to define reconstruction outsourcing concept in all cloud storage schemes for EHRs based on secret sharing, and the results of outsourcing reconstruction can be verified by healthcare centers or patients in our scheme. The theoretical analysis and experimental results also support that our proposed scheme is secure and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the deployment of electronic health records in healthcare institutions has increased widely. Compared with the conventional health records, EHRs have many considerable advantages such as economy, normativity, efficiency and accessibility. The electronic approach provides an easy and ubiquitous access to health data and enhances medical services and researches. The storage of EHRs should guarantee that massive data can be saved and accessed easily for each authorized healthcare center (HC) or patient.
With the advance of information communication technology, the Internet of Things (IoT) [12] , [13] is benefitting our daily lives. To adapt the IoT applications, a cloud service provider offers rapid access to flexible, low-cost resources. Known for these benefits, cloud computing has been increasingly adopted in many fields, including healthcare. With the development of large-scale, on-demand, flexible storing and computing infrastructures provided by cloud computing services, HCs could avoid the burden of data management, reduce the cost of storing massive data by themselves and achieve universal data access with location independence [15] .
EHRs are usually private and confidential since they include patient identifiers and highly sensitive information. However, when using the cloud computing services, users do not have physical control over their data. And cloud service providers are not completely trusted [21] , though the infrastructures under the cloud are much more reliable than personal computing devices. The ''curious'' clouds may have various incentives to be unfaithful toward the cloud users [10] , [20] , [22] . They can either maliciously tamper the data or spy on some sensitive information. Therefore, cloud computing also brings security challenges while its advantages are appealing for EHRs storage [11] , [24] - [28] .
There have been numerous approaches discussing data security and privacy protection issues in cloud computing environments [4] , [6] , [19] . Encryption is a traditional method to protect the privacy of sensitive data stored in clouds. However, the storage of encryption key is a high-risk target and any negative incident may jeopardize all encrypted health records. Aiming to limit a single point failure problem, schemes based on secret sharing are proposed [1] , [7] , [17] , [18] , [23] , [29] . Nonetheless, all the existing cloud storage solutions for EHRs based on secret sharing have some common disadvantages: first, the management of encrypted key is too complicated; second, it is not practical for patients or HCs to execute the expensive reconstruction of shared EHRs. The encrypted key is an obvious and weak target for the whole actual implementation regardless of what symmetric or public-key encryption algorithm is employed. Moreover, it demands tremendous time and resources of clients (patients or HCs) to perform the EHR reconstruction that involves time-consuming modular exponentiation operations, especially when a HC deal with a enormous amount of EHRs. In order to avoid the complicated key management problem, we plan to preprocess the original EHR before its shares are stored in different clouds. Also, we tend to outsource the EHR reconstruction to a cloud computing provider to reduce the local computation burden.
It is our essential goal to propose a practical cloud storage solution for EHRs by using secret sharing to solve the single point failure problem. Unavoidably though, the reconstruction of EHR can become cubersome for personal or healthcare hosts. As a response, we outsource the reconstruction operation to a cloud computing provider, which brings some other challenges. First, the cloud computing server might be curious on user's sensitive data, so we have to make sure that cloud computing server executing the reconstruction outsourcing cannot obtain the original EHRs. Second, the cloud server might return incorrect results intentionally or unintentionally, so HCs have to be able to verify the correctness of the reconstructed EHR. Also, the recovery operation of the original EHR by client hosts should be simpler than the reconstruction operation. To address all the above challenges, we propose our cloud storage for electronic health records based on secret sharing with verifiable reconstruction outsourcing.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
1) We introduce a cloud storage system architecture for EHRs which employs the secret sharing algorithm. 2) We propose a practical cloud storage scheme which satisfies the architecture. As far as we know, our scheme is the first to have defined reconstruction outsourcing concept in all cloud storage schemes for EHRs based on secret sharing, which can significantly improve the client side efficiency. 3) We present the security analysis and comparison experiment results of our proposed scheme. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we give some background information and conduct a literature review. We illustrate our system model in Section III. In Section IV, we introduce our the secure cloud storage scheme. In Section V, the security analysis is given. We evaluate the practical performance of the proposed scheme in Section VI. Finally, the conclusion is made in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Generally, the cloud storage solution for EHRs utilizes several cryptographic cloud solutions for data storage. However, the inherent properties of EHRs make it different from traditional cloud storage schemes. The design of cloud storage solutions for EHRs should consider unique access control policies and exceptions. Specifically, the ''break the glass'' mechanism and a complete and widely-used healthcare system are needed to guarantee well-functional access of EHRs in any case.
A. BACKGROUND 1) ''BREAK THE GLASS'' [8] In case of emergency, ''Break the glass'' mechanism is needed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of EHRs. Previous work [14] has shown ''break the glass'' mechanism has been abused. With such a mechanism in place, the threats in cloud storage solution for EHRs shift from unauthorized access to abuse a policy that allows any valid authenticated user to access any record. This fact indicates that the procedure of handling necessary privilege escalations must be considered at the design stage of an EHRs access control system, strictly enforcing audit processes to prevent abuse. Conversely, regular accesses to the records should not dilute the auditing mechanism to facilitate easier analysis of emergency escalations.
2) HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
In our approach, we assume that all participants in the cloud storage solution for EHRs, including healthcare centers (HCs), cloud service providers (CSPs) and data owners (patients), have a common interest in securing the infrastructure and data against external adversaries (Note that the cloud computing server who helps user for the EHRs reconstruction is not considered as a fully-trusted party). All the participants need to register in healthcare system with valid identity information. Participants can access the EHRs only after being authorized by healthcare system. Besides providing a necessary authorization mechanism, the healthcare system generates and stores corresponding information of EHRs, including unique identifiers for the EHRs.
B. RELATED WORK
We now give a literature review of research areas relevant to this investigation, including cloud storage based on secret sharing and secure outsourced computations.
1) SECRET SHARING
Secret sharing schemes are ideal for storing information that is highly sensitive and highly important. Aiming to limit a single point failure problem, schemes based on secret sharing were proposed [1] , [7] , [17] , [18] , [23] , [29] . Gill et al. [8] utilized a secret sharing scheme to distribute the encryption key among a number of cloud nodes. Ermakova and Fabian [7] proposed a scheme based on Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing [17] which devided the encrypted EHRs into shares to be stored in different cloud service providers. This approach guaranteed less than t cloud service providers colluding to break the privacy cannot obtain EHRs, even if the encryption of EHRs is broken. Besides being used in EHRs cloud storage schemes, secret sharing is also adopted in many cryptographic schemes in cloud computing environment [1] , [18] , [23] , [29] .
Takahashi and Iwamura [18] proposed a system named CloudStash, which applied the secret-sharing scheme directly on the file to store multi-shares of a file into multi-clouds. Compared with the traditional cloud storage, the proposed scheme achieved improvement on confidentiality, availability, performance and fault tolerance. Yang and Lai [23] proposed a new secret sharing scheme that can reduce the amount of shares, which is suitable for cloud systems, and they proved that the scheme is computationally secure. Alsolami and Boult [1] designed the secure cloud computing (SCC) by employing Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and symmetric bivariate polynomial based secret sharing. Zhu et al. [29] proposed a robust and simple N-Party entangled authentication cloud storage protocol based on secret sharing scheme.
2) SECURE OUTSOURCING
There have been a number of research efforts on securely outcourcing computations [3] , [9] in the past decades. These research works mainly focused on the secure outsourcing algorithms for basic cryptographic operations and large scale scientific computations.
The basic cryptographic operations are sometimes too expensive for resource-constrained devices. Many researchers investigated how to securely outsource cryptographic computations. Chaum and Pedersen [3] first brought up the idea of ''Wallet with Observers'' in 1992. It allowed a service provider install a piece of secure hardware on the client's device to carry out expensive computations for the client. In 2005, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [9] proposed the first formal security model for outsourcing cryptographic computations. They also presented practical secure outsourcing schemes for modular exponentiation and CCA2-secure encryption. Besides basic cryptographic operation, scientific computing is another area that researchers focus on. These computations are usually complicated, and involve some sensitive data. In 2001, Atallah et al. [2] first presented a generic framework for secure outsourcing of scientific computations. However, the proposed framework cannot detect the misbehaviour of cloud server. Chen et al. [5] leveraged the sparse matrix to develop a secure outsourcing algorithm for the large-scale linear equations. Their algorithm needs only one round communication between the client and server, and the proposed algorithm is able to detect the misbehaviour of cloud server with probability 1. Salinas et al. [16] developed an efficient secure outsourcing algorithm for solving large-scale sparse linear systems of equations (SLSEs). Also, they implemented their scheme on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, and their algorithm beats other algorithms in efficiency.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The notations of the proposed scheme are represented in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the system architecture. The system architecture is designed to store EHRs on different HCs using secret sharing. As shown in figure 1 , the key components include: the preprocessing of EHRs, distribution of preprocessed EHRs, reconstruction outsourcing, verification and recovery of EHRs. Additionally, our cloud storage solution for EHRs handles necessary privilege escalations of EHRs access control to satisfy the ''break the glass'' mechanism. But the details of how to identify emergency situations are not discussed in this paper. We just concentrate on the key design components that are directly related with our designing goals of system architecture.
We now describe the workflow of the system. Assuming that the EHRs are created by a healthcare center named HC − A. After HC − A uploads the EHR to a healthcare system, the healthcare system generates an unique identifier for it, which is relevant to patient's ID, HC − A 's ID, time stamp, etc. In the preprocessing phase, the healthcare system performs a bitwise exclusive OR operation between the EHR and its hash value. Then healthcare system distributes the preprocessed EHR into n shares using Shamir's threshold secret sharing algorithm and sends the n shares to n different cloud service providers CP 1 , . . . , CP n according the protocols between healthcare institutions and CPs. When the owner of the EHR or an authorized healthcare center HC − B wants to get the EHR, they send a request through the healthcare system. After confirming the request, healthcare system assigns a cloud service provider CP re (CP re ) to do the reconstruction operation. The assigned outsourcing cloud service provider CP re (CP re ) gets t or more shares from CP 1 , . . . , CP n . After finishing the reconstruction, CP re (CP re ) returns the result s to HC − B (or the patient) through healthcare system. At last, HC −B (or the patient) can recover the original EHR with its hash value stored in healthcare system by simply performing a bitwise exclusive OR operation. In addition, the validity of the recovered EHR can be verified.
1) DESIGN GOALS
To enable the privacy and confidentiality of EHRs and practical performance of the cloud storage solution under aforementioned system architecture, our designed scheme should achieve the following security and performance goals:
• EHRs are distributed into shares that are stored on different CPs respectively, then the EHRs are accessible even if a few CPs break down.
• The ''curious'' cloud or colluded clouds cannot acknowledge the real contents.
• The reconstruction operation of shared EHRs is outsourced to a cloud computing provider, so that no complicated computation is needed for an authorized party, such as a healthcare center or the owner of the EHR, to reconstruct the EHRs.
• Because the cloud computing providers are not completely trusted, the results of reconstruction outsourcing should be able to be verifiable by healthcare centers or patients.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our cloud storage scheme for EHRs based on secret sharing, which includes a novel concept-reconstruction outsourcing. After introducing the basic assumptions, we define reconstruction outsourcing and elaborate the four phases of the proposed scheme.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
The EHR file R uploaded to healthcare system is divided into m blocks
where p is a big prime. H (.) is a collision-resistant one-way hash function, which satisfies
For example the SHA-3 can be one candidate. Also note that the size of each block is equal with the hash size. As a result, the expression R ⊗ H (R) actually means that each block b i of R does the bitwise exclusive OR operation with H (R).
B. PROPOSAL
The proposed cloud storage scheme for EHRs consists of four phases, namely the preprocessing phase, the distribution phase, the reconstruction outsourcing phase, and the recovery and verification phase. Before elaborating the proposed scheme, we first give the definition of reconstruction outsourcing. Reconstruction outsourcing is a processing method of reconstruction in a cloud storage solution based on secret sharing. Unlike a conventional way, the reconstruction of stored data in different cloud service providers is outsourced to a cloud computing provider, so that the computing resources of client hosts can be saved. In our case, the reconstruction outsourcing of preprocessed EHRs must make sure that the outsourcing cloud service provider cannot obtain any content of the EHRs during the reconstruction.
Without the loss of generality, we assume HC − A is the generator of an EHR. We will show how the proposed cloud storage scheme works by taking the EHR generated by HC − A as an example. HC − A defines a policy for the storage and retrieval of the EHR before uploading it to the healthcare system. And the policy is used to guide the CPs for the distribution and reconstruction of the EHR. For instance, the values of n and t are decided by the policy.
1) PREPROCESSING PHASE
The preprocessing operation of EHRs is executed by a healthcare system. After HC −A uploads the EHR, denoted as a file to the healthcare system, the healthcare system generates a unique identifier for the EHR and computes the hash value of R. The identifier and H (R) are both stored in the healthcare system. Then the healthcare system performs the preprocessing of R by making each block of R do the bitwise exclusive OR operation with H (R):
[S 1 , . . . , S m ] is the result of the preprocessing with R, each of which will be divided and distributed to n different CPs by secret sharing. The the bitwise exclusive OR operation protects the privacy of the EHR from the cloud service provider to execute the reconstruction outsourcing. Detailed security analysis is given is SectionV.
2) DISTRIBUTION PHASE
The healthcare system is in charge of distribution of the preprocessed EHR. First, healthcare system selects m poly-
and [a 10 , . . . , a m0 ] = [S 1 , . . . , S m ]. Then the healthcare system computes n shares of {s 1i , . . . , s mi } (i = 1, . . . , n)and distributes them to CP 1 , . . . , CP n respectively. The shares {s 1i = f 1 (i) , . . . , s mi = f m (i)} and the identifier of the EHR are uploaded to CP by healthcare system. The identifier can be used to retrieve the preprocessed EHR when a reconstruction is needed. The main steps of preprocessing and distribution phase are shown in Table 2 .
3) RECONSTRUCTION OUTSOURCING PHASE
The reconstruction of a secret requires a massive amount of computations since it involves solving a large-scale system of linear equations. The computation workload for a resourcelimited client is burdensome. To improve the efficiency on the client side, we propose the reconstruction outsourcing scheme. The detailed process is discussed as follows:
Assuming another healthcare provider HC −B needs to get the EHR. The healthcare system first verifies the authorization of HC − B to check if it has the right to get the requested EHR. If the authorization passes, healthcare system outsources the reconstruction to a cloud service provider CP RE . Notice that here we consider the CP RE to be a curious and dishonest party, which is the strongest threat model. In other words, the cloud server has the potential to return incorrect computation results or steal useful information from the inputs. CP RE gets no less than t shares from CP 1 , . . . , CP n to reconstruct the preprocessed EHR, i,e.R. Without loss of generality, we assume CP RE gets k shares
from CP 1 , . . . , CP k . CP RE computes S 1 , . . . , S m using Lagrange interpolation polynomial and sends them to HC−B:
Notice that by doing the bitwise exclusive OR operation with the hash value of R, the content of each block could be blinded. Consequently, although the cloud service provider to execute the reconstruction outsourcing recovered the [S 1 , . . . , S m ] out of the data from CP 1 , . . . , CP n , he cannot reveal any information useful on the original EHR. Thus, reconstruction outsourcing process is secure against the curious cloud server. If it holds, the recovered R is the real original EHR. Otherwise, the recovered R is not the real EHR and HC − B reflects to healthcare system. The verification process ensures that both the cloud service providers to store the EHR and the cloud service provider to execute the reconstruction outsourcing behave honest. The main steps in reconstruction outsourcing, recovery and verification phase are illustrated in Table 3 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of the proposed scheme based on the design goals of system architecture described in section III.
Theorem 1: The EHRs stored on the cloud service providers under our proposed cloud storage scheme can be reconstructed with t or more valid shares.
Proof : Our proposed cloud storage scheme for EHRs utilizes Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing algorithm to distribute shares of the preprocessed EHRs to different CPs. According to Lagrange interpolation theorem, to reconstruct a polynomial with t − 1 degree needs at last t points on the polynomial curve. Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing algorithm applies Lagrange interpolation polynomial to reconstruct the secret, and the shares are actually the points on the selected polynomial curve. For each block of the EHR, S l , with t shares of the data, we can get the following system of linear equations:
The above system of linear equations can be solved with the Lagrange interpolation theorem:
Thus, t shares of the stored on the CPs are enough to reconstruct each S l . And the ERH can be recovered as:
Even a few CPs break down and the shares on them are gone, the reconstruction of stored preprocessed EHRs can still run normally, as long as there are t or more than t corresponding shares are secure. In another word, our scheme with the property of robustness can solve the single point failure problem.
Theorem 2: The probability of leaking the EHRs to CPs or CP RE is negligible.
Proof: Case 1 : The CPs are not colluded. When the CPs are non-colluded, for each block of EHR, S l , each CP only has one share of data, which is one x, f l (x) pair of the follow equation:
To solve the equation and get the value of a l0 , we need at least t x values and the corresponding value of f l (x). With only one pair, we can have infinite combinations of a l0 , a l1 , . . . , a lt−1 which can satisfy the above equation. The value of a l0 is therefore unobtainable for the CPs. Thus, the probability for CPs to reveal the value of EHRs from their shares of data is the same as the method of exhaustion, which is negligible.
Case 2 : t or more CPs are colluded. When t or more CPs are colluded, they can exchange shares they have. Consequently, for each block of the EHR, S l , the CPs can get at least t shares of data. Thus, the following system of equations can be constructed: The value of each S l can be obtained by the CPs. Notice that the preprocessing of EHRs in our proposed scheme uses the hash value H (R) to blind each block of R. To recover the EHRs, the CPs need the value of S l and the value of H (R). Thus, the problem of recovering EHRs can be transformed to finding the hash value H (R), in which the probability is negligible. The same logic applies to the CP RE executing the outsourcing reconstruction operation, it can not obtain the EHR with the preprocessing results reconstructed. Thus, the probability of leaking the EHRs to CPs or CP RE is negligible.
Theorem 3: The result of reconstruction outsourcing process can be verified by the health center or patients.
Proof : In the recovery and verification phase of our proposed scheme, the result of reconstruction is verified by checking the equation
. If the value S l is valid, we can have the following derivations:
Thus, the correct results can pass the verification. If the S l is invalid, we can have the following derivations:
That means the correct results can pass the verification. Thus, by checking the equation H R ? = H (R), the patient or the HC who requests the EHR can verify the result reconstructed by CP RE is valid or not.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have conducted a performance evaluation to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed strategies. In the following, we first present evaluation methodology and then describe the evaluation results.
A. METHODOLOGY
To evaluate the practical efficiency of our proposed scheme, we developed an application with a userfriendly interface, and conducted comprehensive experiments that simulate the outsourcing process. The experiment was carried out on the Windows 10 on Intel Pentium processor of 2.70 GHz with 4 GB memory. We implemented our proposed scheme in Python with secretsharing(https://github.com/blockstack/secret-sharing), which is a free library for securely splitting secrets with Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme. In our experiments, MD-5 is used as the hash function. Please kindly notice that we picked MD-5 for the experiments just for simplicity purpose. We conducted the proof of concept experiments to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.In our developed application, users are allowed to define the number of servers n that the secret is distributed to, which ranges from 20-200. The threshold t is set by users as well, which ranges from 20 to 200. The experimental results are calculated as the average value of 10 executions of the algorithms.
B. EVALUATION RESULTS
In the first experiment, we evaluate the preprocessing phase and the recovery and verification phase. Note that these two phases are irrelevant to the number of servers and the threshold. Fig. 2 indicates the variation of the time cost versus the size of secret, which ranges from 20 to 200 MB. As we can observe from the figure, the time cost increases as the size of secret grows, which is obvious and sound. Also, there is not much time cost difference between the preprocessing phase and the recovery and verification phase.
In our second attempt, we set the threshold t statically as 20. Fig. 3 compares the client side time cost of the proposed scheme between with and without outsourcing. It shows the relationship between the time cost and the number of servers n. The client side operations include the reconstruction phase and the recovery and verification phase. Note that the preprocessing phase and the distribution phase only have to been executed once, so we does not take them into concern when evaluating the client side time cost. As we can see from the figure, the time cost increases when the number of servers grows. In addition, the time cost of our outsourcing approach is much less than that without outsourcing. The reconstruction phase is the most time-consuming part since it involves solving large-scale system of linear equations. For a system of linear equations Ax = b, where A ∈ R n * n , the complexity to solve the equations is O(n p ), where 2 < p ≤ 3. The recovery and verification phase only involves bitwise exclusive OR operations, in which the complexity is O(n). Thus, compared with the reconstruction phase, the time cost of the recovery and verification phase is negligible. Without outsourcing, the client side needs to execute the reconstruction phase as well as the recovery and verification phase. In our scheme with reconstruction outsourcing, the client side only needs to perform the recovery and verification phase. Thus, the time cost of our outsourcing approach is much less than that without outsourcing, which is reasonable and sound. Fig. 4 compares the time cost between reconstruction phase and distribution phase. We have the following two observations: First, the distribution phase costs much more time than the reconstruction phase. The underling reason is that the distribution phase involves massive modular exponentiations when computing the shares, which are expensive computations. The reconstruction phase computes the results using Lagrange interpolation polynomial, which are lighter computations compared with modular exponentiations. Second, the time cost of distribution increases with the number of servers, while the time cost of the reconstruction remains invariable when the number of servers grows. In the distribution phase, the heath center needs to calculate n shares of the secret, so it is rational that the time cost increases with n. Meanwhile, the calculation in reconstruction phase is independent of the number of servers n.
To present statistical results, we also evaluate the standard deviation of the data corresponding to fig. 3 . As we can observe from table 4, the standard deviation for time cost without outsourcing is around 1, while the standard deviation for time cost of our scheme is around 0.1.
In the third experiment, we set a static number of servers n to 200 and observe the variation of the time cost to the threshold t. Fig. 5 compares the client side time cost between with and without outsourcing. We have the following two observations from the figure. First, the time cost increases when the number of servers grows. In addition, the time cost of our outsourcing approach is much less than that without outsourcing. Fig. 6 compares the time cost between reconstruction phase and distribution phase. As we can see, the distribution phase costs much more time than the reconstruction phase. The above analysis applies here as well. Also, the time cost of both distribution and reconstruction remains increasing when the threshold t grows. In the distribution phase, the heath center needs to calculate n shares of the secret. In each share, the number of modular exponentiations is decided by the threshold t, so it is rational that the time cost increases with t. For reconstruction phase, the scale of the system of equations is in connection with t, so the time cost increases with t. We also evaluate the time cost of the scheme with variational file size. We set the number of servers as 100 and the threshold as 50, the file size ranges from 256 to 2048KB. Fig. 7 shows the time cost comparison between with and without outsourcing. Note that these two curves show the subtotal time cost of reconstruction and verification. Fig. 8 compares the time cost between reconstruction phase and distribution phase. Our first observation is that the distribution phase costs much more time than the reconstruction phase. And the above analysis on these two phases also applies here. Also, the time cost increases with the file size, which is obvious and sound.
As a conclusion, both the distribution phase and the reconstruction phase are time consuming. Our proposed outsourcing approach effectively reduces the burden for the reconstruction phase. As for the distribution phase, since the user only needs to execute it once, we did not take it into concern when we design the scheme. Therefore, the outsourcing for distribution was not designed.
VII. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a novel privacy-preserving cloud storage scheme for electronic health records based on Shamir's Secret Sharing. To address the problem that the reconstruction of shared EHR is burdensome for a healthcare center or a patient in a real-world application, we proposed a secure outsourcing approach for the secret reconstruction of shared EHR leveraging a computational powerful cloud service provider. Through theoretical analysis, we demonstrated that the proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements. We also conducted experiments on real documents, and the results show that, when our proposed reconstruction outsourcing approach is in place, the operation cost for healthcare centers and patients can be reduced significantly. 
